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Abstract
This paper studies the long-run macroeconomic, distributional and welfare effects of
tuition policy and student loans. We therefore form a rich model of risky human capital
investment based on the seminal work of Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1998). We ex-
tend their original model by variable labor supply, borrowing constraints, idiosyncratic
wage risk, uncertain life-span, and multiple schooling decisions. This allows us to build
a direct link between students and their parents and make the initial distribution of peo-
ple over different socio-economic backgrounds endogenous.
Our simulation indicate that privatization of tertiary education comes with a vast
reduction in the number of students, an increase in the college wage premium and long-
run welfare losses of around 5 percent. Surprisingly, we ﬁnd that from privatization of
tertiary education, students are better off compared to workers from other educational
classes, since the college wage premium nearly doubles. In addition, our model predicts
that income contingent loans on which students don’t have to pay interest, improve the
college enrolment situation for agents from all kinds of backgrounds.
JEL Classiﬁcation: I22, J24, H52
Keywords: public vs. private education, schooling choice, human capital investment,
idiosyncratic uncertainty
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Since the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court in 2005, which paved the way for
tuition fees in Germany, higher educational ﬁnance has become more important than ever.
Whether to make students pay for their tertiary education or not was a popular topic in the
public dialogue. On the one hand, defenders of the existing public higher education system
argued with the existence of external effects, liquidity constraints and uninsurable tertiary
education risk, see Wigger (2004) or Kupferschmidt and Wigger (2006) for a discussion. On
the other hand, advocates of tuition fees refer to the negative distributional consequences of
educational subsidies, see Borgloh, Kupferschmidt and Wigger (2008).
In the theoretical literature, higher education subsidies and the optimal design of student
loans have received some attention. Garc´ ıa-Pe˜ nalosa and W¨ alde (2000), for example, study
optimal educational ﬁnance in a model of endogenous schooling choice. As education in
their model is a risky investment, they argue for tuition ﬁnanced education with income
contingent governmental student loans. They ﬁnd that a graduate tax system, where suc-
cessful university graduates pay for the burden arising from unsuccessful students, is to be
favored, because there is no ex-post redistribution from the unskilled to the skilled. In addi-
tion, Wigger and von Weiz¨ acker (2001) show in a one-period model that government should
insure educational risk completely in a ﬁrst-best setup. If, however, adverse selection and
moral hazard problems arise, a success dependent tuition fee system should be optimal.
Caucutt and Kumar (2003) explore in a two-period OLG setup the effects of higher educa-
tion subsidies on college enrolment, welfare and efﬁciency. Their analysis indicates that a
policy to make enrollment decisions independent of ability comes with an inefﬁcient use of
educational resources and only produces small welfare gains. Maximizing the number of
students via a subsidy system enforces the problem of inefﬁcient use and does not generate
any positive welfare effects at all.
The model of Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1998) often acts as a basis for numerical analy-
ses of tuition and higher education subsidies. Thismodel originally wasdesigned to analyze
the sources of wage inequality trends in the US in the after war period. The model features
both schooling choice and on-the-job human capital investment. It allows for heterogeneity
in abilities and general equilibrium price reactions. The main ﬁnding of their seminal work
is that changes in wage differentials in the US can only be explained by skill-biased techni-
cal change. These results are conﬁrmed by Abraham (2008) and Keane and Roemer (2009)
in even richer frameworks. de La Croix and Docquier (2007) use an 8 period endogenous
human capital investment model in order to identify the sources of the evolution of skill
premia in France and the US. In the US, higher educational costs damped the rise in edu-
cational attainment and contributed to higher wage differentials between the unskilled and
1the skilled. Hence, skill biased technical change is essential to understanding rising school
attendance. In contrast, an expansionary educational policy boasted the supply of skills and
kept the skill premium low in France. However, skill biased technical change only played a
minor role in explaining wage differentials.
In a following analysis, Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1999) use their estimated general
equilibrium model to analyze the effects of tax reform and educational subsidy policy. They
state that a500$revenue neutralincrease intuition subsidiesleadstoa5.3percentincreasein
the number of students in a partial equilibrium model. However, incorporating the general
equilibrium effects, the effect shrinks to 0.46 percent. Hence, analyzing tuition policy in
general equilibrium seems absolutely necessary. Akyol and Athreya (2005) study a model of
risky human capital formation with inﬁnitely lived consumers who make a schooling choice
in the ﬁrst period of life. They ﬁnd that higher education subsidies increase the number of
students and the wage of the lower skilled, which in turn narrows the skill premium. In
addition, as there is a certain chance of college failure, i.e. people might drop back to the
class of lower skilled workers, the risk of college education shrinks.
Garriga and Keightley (2007) form a very detailed model of risky college human capital
formation. Early drop-outs and resulting partial education are possible and endogenous.
In addition, the effort put on college education inﬂuences the outcome. The authors study
the effect of tuition subsidies, grant subsidies and loan limit restrictions. They ﬁnd that
broad band tuition policies and grants increase enrolment, but mainly that of lower ability
students that might drop-out early or need a longer time for their studies. Merit based sub-
sidies, on the other hand, counter-act this adverse selection problem, however at the price
of lower aggregate enrolment rates. Gallipoli, Meghir and Violante (2008) analyze the long-
run effects of different educational policies on the distribution of education and earnings
in a model with endogenous labor supply, idiosyncratic income risk and schooling choice.
Their model features three different schooling types: lower than high-school, high-school
and college. They estimate dynamic income processes, the distribution of ability and a tran-
sition process for ability from US data. They ﬁnally introduce tuition subsidies which are
conditional on ﬁnancial resources. Those are successful in increasing enrolment rates and re-
ducing inequality in partial equilibrium. In general equilibrium, however, subsidies mainly
act on more able but liquidity constraint agents, so that the education of less able might be
crowded out and inequality rises. Ionescu (2009) forms an OLG model of both schooling
choice and human capital investment without riskiness in human capital investment. Stu-
dents can borrow on student loans during the time of their college education, where the
interest rates on those credits is uncertain. She ﬁnds that learning ability and initial human
capital drive the college enrolment decision, whereas parental wealth is not very important.
She then analyzes different repayment schemes for student loans. Allowing students to log-
2in their interest rates or switch repayment plans increases enrolment in this model, whereas
relaxed loan eligibility requirements have little effects. Hence, subsidizing repayment rather
than increasing eligibility is to be favored.
The OLG model of endogenous schooling choice and on-the-job human capital accumula-
tion we use to quantify the long-run effects of higher education ﬁnancing is also based on
the work of Heckman et al. (1998). We extend their original model in various directions. Be-
neath modeling variable labor supply, borrowing constraints, idiosyncratic wage risk, and
uncertain life-span, we consider multiple schooling decisions in the sense of Gallipoli et al.
(2008). This allows us to build a direct link between students and their parents. On the one
hand, students’ schooling choice depends on the educational background of their parents.
On the other hand, the ﬁnal distribution of agents over educational levels is determined by
the schooling choice at the beginning of the life cycle. This leads to different intra-cohort
distributional effects compared to conventional models that ﬁx the initial distribution over
ability and educational background once and for all.
In contrast to Gallipoli et al. (2008), we let agents still invest into human capital on-the-
job, where this investment is of risky type. Furthermore, we make the tertiary education
schooling choice, i.e. the college enrolment decision, a risky investment. We assume, in line
with Garc´ ıa-Pe˜ nalosa and W¨ alde (2000) that, at the end of their university phase, students
have to take a ﬁnal exam, which they only pass with a certain probability. Finally, a detailed
modeling of the government sector with taxes on consumption, labor and interest income,
governmental debt, educational spending and a pay-as-you-go Bismarckian pension system
complements our model.
We calibrate our model to the German economy in 2007 and estimate production parame-
ters for the production of human capital on-the-job and an autoregressive process for the
evolution of labor income shocks. We then simulate a privatization of the current pub-
licly ﬁnanced education system as well as the introduction of income contingent student
loans. Our simulations indicate that privatization of tertiary education comes with a vast
reduction in the number of students, an increase in the college wage premium and long-
run welfare losses of around 5 percent of initial resources. In addition, if we account for
the fact that the initial distribution of households across socio-economic backgrounds is en-
dogenous, schooling choice behavior is altered signiﬁcantly. Surprisingly, we ﬁnd that from
privatization of tertiary education, students are better off compared to workers from other
educational classes, since the college wage premium nearly doubles and the decline in con-
sumption tax rates can’t offset the decrease in labor income for lower educated households.
This result is in contrast to common theoretical models of schooling, where wages usually
are ﬁxed, see e.g. Garc´ ıa-Pe˜ nalosa and W¨ alde (2000). Finally, our model predicts that the de-
clining college enrolment rates and welfare losses from tertiary education privatization can’t
3be offset by an income contingent student loan system, which shifts the burden of tuition to
later periods in life and provides insurance against college failure.
In terms of income contingent loans that are given on top of the current publicly ﬁnanced
education system, two major points arise. First, income contingent loans might reduce en-
rolment rates for people with richer socio-economic backgrounds due to the reduction in
the college wage premium. Second, loans on which students don’t have to pay interest,
i.e. loans that act like a tertiary education subsidy, improve the college enrolment situation
for agents from all kinds of socio-economic backgrounds. With income revenues increasing
with this reforms, the burdens arising from income contingency are carried to a large part
by successful college graduates and, hence, the consumption tax rate increases only slightly.
Consequently, the common argument that mainly people with lower education carry the
burden of subsidies to higher education does not hold in this case.
The remainderof the paperisorganized asfollows. Section 2 givesa detailed insight into the
model. Section 3 describes our parameter estimations and calibration methodology. Simu-
lation results are presented in Section 4. Section 5 offers some concluding remarks.
2 The model economy
2.1 Demographics and intracohort heterogeneity
We consider an economy populated by overlapping generations of individuals, which may
live up to a maximum possible lifespan of J periods. At the beginning of each period, a new
generation is born where we assume a population growth rate of n. Since individuals face
lifespan uncertainty, ψj < 1 denotes the time-invariant conditional survival probability from
age j − 1t oa g ej with ψJ+1 = 0.
Our model is solved recursively. Consequently, an age-j agent faces the state vector
zj =( sj,ςj,sp,aj,epj,hj,ηj) (1)
where sj ∈S= {1,...,S} and sp ∈Sare agent’s current schooling level at age j and
time-invariant socio-economic background, i.e. parent’s schooling level. ςj ∈I= {0,1}
indicates whether the individual is still in education or already has fully joined the labor
force, see below. Finally, aj ∈ A =[ 0,∞), epj ∈ P =[ 0,ep] and hj ∈ H =[ 0,∞) denote
assets held at the beginning of age j, accumulated earning points for public pension claims
and stock of human capital,1 and ηj ∈E=[ 0,∞) is a shock to household’s productivity.
1 In the following, human capital and labor productivity are used synonymously.
4The productivity shock is assumed to follow a ﬁrst-order Markov process described in more
detail below. For the sake of simpliﬁcation, we let C = A × P × H ×Ethe set of continuous
states.
According to the initial distribution at age j = 1, mortality rates, population growth, the
Markov process and optimal household decisions, each age-j cohort is fragmented into sub-
groups ξ(zj).L e tX(zj) be the corresponding cumulated measure to ξ(zj).H e n c e ,
 
S×I×S×H×E
dX(z1)=1w i t hz1 =( s1,ς1,sp,0,0,h1,η1) (2)
must hold, since we have normalized the cohort size of newborns to be unity.
By assumption, parents are of age jp when their children enter the economically relevant
age. Accordingly, the initial distribution of agents across socio-economic backgrounds sp
depends on the number of agents of different schooling types sjp at age jp. For example,
assume that there are only two types of education, i.e. S = 2, and at age jp 60 percent of
agents hold a high-school and 40 percent a college degree. Hence, in the newborn cohort,
there will be 60 percent of agent with socio-economic background sp = 1 (i.e. high school)
and 40 percent with sp = 2.
In the following, we will omit the state indices zj for every variable whenever possible.
Agents are then only distinguished according to their age j.
2.2 The household decision problem
The decision about assets, leisure and on-the-job training
Our model assumes a preference structure that is represented by a time-separable, nested
CES utility function. Extending the model of Heckman et al. (1998) by variable labor supply,
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1− 1
γ ,( 3 )
where cj,  j and ej indicate consumption, leisure time and on-the-job human capital invest-
ment at age j, respectively, and γ is the intertemporal rate of substitution between consump-












ρ ,( 4 )
2 We use this monotonic transformation of the regular CES utility function for computational reasons, as it
guarantees utility to be bound from below by 0.
5where ρ denotestheintratemporal elasticity ofsubstitution betweenconsumption andleisure
at each age j while α is the age-independent leisure preference parameter.
Households maximize (3) subject to the budget constraint






+ bj + κj − (1 + τc)cj (5)
with a1 =aJ+1 = 0a n da j ≥ 0. In addition to interest income from savings raj, households
receive gross labor income wj during their working period as well as public pensions pj dur-
ing retirement. If they have fully joined the labor force, i.e. ςj = 0, agents can devote their
overall time endowment of 1 to leisure consumption, on-the-job human capital investment
and work. If still in education, they are not allowed to additionally invest into human capi-






ws(1 −  j − ej)hjηj,i f ςj = 0
ws(1 −   −  j)hjηj,i f ςj = 1,
(6)
where ws deﬁnes the wage rate for effective labor of schooling class s, hj household’s labor
efﬁciency and ηj the current shock to labor income. At speciﬁc ages, households also re-
ceive accidental bequests bj as well as inter vivos transfers κj. Contributions at a rate τ are
paid to the public pension system up to a ceiling which amounts to the double of average
income ¯ w. Income taxes depend on taxable labor and capital income yw
j and yr
j and the tax
schedule T[·,·] which is explainedbelow. Finally, the price of consumption goods cj includes
consumption taxes τc.
In order to manage their costs of living, children that are in education, i.e. ςj = 1, receive




wjpdX(zjp),w i t h zj =( ·,·,sp,·,·,·,·) and zjp =( sp,·,·,·,·,·,·).( 7 )
Note that, if children are of socio-economic background sp, their parents obviously have
to be of schooling class sjp = sp. As agents with higher educational degree usually have
a higher income, the level of inter vivos transfers will rise with increasing socio-economic
background. Finally, the necessary (negative) κjp for the parent generations can be computed
from the amount of transfers, cohort sizes and the fraction of children choosing a certain
level of education.
Ourmodel abstracts from private annuitymarkets. Consequently, private assetsofall agents
who died are aggregated and then distributed among all working age cohorts following an










qk+1(zk)dX(zk) ∀ j < jr,
with zj =( ·,·,sp,·,·,·,·) and zk =( sp,·,·,·,·,·,·),( 8 )
where qk+1(zk)=( 1+r)ak+1(zk). The distribution of bequests is computed in every period,
where we assume that children alwaysinherit assets of theirparents’ generation jp. Since be-
quest can only be received during employment, we adjust this rule at the beginning and the
end of the employment phase. In order to account for agents’ socio-economic background,
within each cohort, the distribution is computed such that households with background sp
receive assets from agents of schooling type sjp = sp of the parental generation. Among indi-
viduals of a cohort and socio-economic background, bequests are then distributed equally.
As the more educated usually are the more wealthy, households with richer parents will
receive more bequests than those with poorer socio-economic background.
Accumulated earning points of the pension system depend on the relative income position
wj/ ¯ w of the worker at working age j < jr. Since the contribution ceilingisﬁxed atthe double
of average income ¯ w, maximum earning points collected per year are 2. Therefore, earning
points accumulate according to
epj+1 = epj + min[wj/ ¯ w;2],( 9 )
where ep1 = 0.
In addition to investing in capital, households can devote time to on-the-job human capital
investment. Following Heckman et al. (1998) we assume that on-the-job training just needs





j +( 1 − δh
s)hj, (10)
where As is a production efﬁciency parameter, which indicates agent’s ability to transform
received education into labor productivity, νs and ωs are elasticities with respect to time and
human capital input and δh
s is depreciation on actual human capital.
Schooling choice and inter vivos transfers
Figure 1 shows the dynamics of schooling choice in our model, where we have assumed
S = 3. Following Gallipoli et al. (2008) we assume several schooling choices that take place
at different stages in the life-cycle. Lets denote by js the date of labor-market entry for an
agent who has successfully completed schooling level s. At the beginning of the life-cycle at
7Figure 1: Schooling choice and labor market entry















j1, all agents are of the same initial schooling type s1 = 1. They now have to make their ﬁrst
educational decision. If they choose to drop out of the schooling system, i.e. ςj1 = 0, they
enter the labor force and stay in schooling level 1 for the rest of their life. If they decide to
stay in school, they remain in the schooling level 1 until the next date of labor market entry
j2.A tj2 they again have to make a drop out or stay decision, etc.
We model the highest possible level of education, i.e. sj = 3, as a risky investment. In this
case there is a certain chance of failing. If households decide to participate in the highest ed-
ucational program, theyhavetotake aﬁnal examin theyearbefore labormarket entry j3−1,
which they either pass or fail with the exogenous probability pf. Hence, a the beginning of
j3,af r a c t i o npf of the agents that are still in the schooling system remains in schooling class
2, but changes to ςj3 = 0, and a fraction 1− pf changes to sj = 3. The expected college wage
premium therefore can be deﬁned as
 





Note that their is no ςj = 1 agent in the highest educational class, as households in this class
already have run through the maximum number of years of education.
In line with Taber (2002), agents decide about their drop-out via a comparison of utilities.






















are the utilities agent receives from staying in school or drop-
ping out, i.e. z1
js =( s,1,sp,·,·,·,·) and z1
js =( s,0,sp,·,·,·,·), respectively, and εs,sp measures
8psychological costs of schooling. We hereby assume that εs,sp is normally distributed with
mean μs,sp and variance σ2 across every socio-economic background sp ∈ S.


























is the fraction of agents that decide to drop out of the schooling system at age js.
2.3 The production side
Firms in this economy use capital and labor of different types s to produce a single good
according to a Cobb-Douglas production technology Y =  K L1−  where Y,K and L are
aggregate output, capital and labor, respectively,   is capital’s share in production, and  

















λs = 1. (14)










where a corporate tax rate τk is applied to output net of labor costs and depreciation. Firms
maximize proﬁts renting capital and hiring labor from households, so that net marginal
products equal r the interest rate for capital and ws the wage rates for effective labor of
different types.
2.4 The government sector
Our model distinguishes between the tax system and the pension system. In each period,
government issues new debt nBG and collects taxes from households and ﬁrms in order to
ﬁnance general government expenditure G which is ﬁxed per capita, educational spending
Gs
3 on the different types of schooling systems which are held constant per student as well
as interest payments on its debt, i.e.




Gs + rBG. (16)
3 Note that, as the fraction of people who complete schooling type 1 is always 1 by deﬁnition, we can incor-
porate G1 in general government expenditure G.














and C deﬁnes aggregate consumption (see (24)).
We assume that contributions to public pensions are exempted from tax while beneﬁts are
fully taxed. Consequently, taxable labor income yw
j is computed from gross labor income net
of pension contributions, a ﬂexible work related allowance dw(wj), and – after retirement –
public pensions. Interest income is taxed separately at a ﬂat tax rate with a ﬁxed allowance
of dr.H e n c e ,
yw
j = max[wj − τ min[wj,2¯ w] − dw(wj);0]+pj,a n dyr
j = max(raj − dr;0). (18)
Given taxableincome, weapplytheprogressive taxcodeof2005inGermanytolaborincome












,w h e r e
τz is a solidarity surcharge. This corresponds to the ﬂat capital gains tax system recently
introduced in Germany. The governmental budget is closed period-by-period by adjusting
the consumption tax rate.
In each period, the pension system pays old-age beneﬁts and collects payroll contributions
from wage income below the contribution ceiling of 2 ¯ w. Individual pension beneﬁts pj of a
retiree at age j ≥ jr in a speciﬁc year are computed from the product of her earning points
epjr she has accumulated at retirement and the actual pension amount (APA) per earning
point
pj = epjr × APA. (19)
The budget of the pension system must be balanced periodically by adjusting the social
security tax rate τ.C o n s e q u e n t l y ,τ = PB















deﬁne aggregate pensions beneﬁts and the contribution base.
2.5 Equilibrium conditions
Given the ﬁscal policy Ψ = {G,{Gs}S
s=2,T [·,·], BG,τc,τr,τk,τ}, a recursive equilibrium path
is a set of value functions {V(zj)}
J
j=1, household decision rules {cj(zj), j(zj),ej(zj)}
J
j=1,
10distributions of unintended bequest {bj(zj)}
J
j=1, a time-invariant measure of households
{ξ(zj)}
J
j=1 and relative prices of labor and capital {{ws}s
s=1,r} so that the following condi-
tions are satisﬁed:
1. Households’ decision rules solve the household’s decision problem (3) subject to the
given constraints (5), (10) and (9).
2. Factor prices are competitive, i.e.




   ∂L
∂Ls
, (22)



























aj(zj)dX(zj) − BG, (25)
while in the small open economy aggregate capital is derived from (23).













qj+1(zj)(1 − ψj+1)dX(zj). (26)
5. The budgets of the government and the pension system are balanced.
6. The goods market clears, i.e.
Y = C +( n + δk)K + G + ∑
S
s=2 Gs (closed economy)
Y = C +( n + δk)K + G + ∑
S
s=2 Gs + NX (open economy)
with NX as net exports.
112.6 The computational algorithm
Solving the individual household problem
In order to compute a solution of the complex household problem, we discretize the state
space. The state of a household is determined by zj =( sj,ςj,sp,aj,epj,hj,ηj) ∈S×I×S×




j } are discrete sets. For allthesepossible states zj wecompute the optimal decision
of households from (3). Since u(cj, j) is not differentiable in every (cj, j) and V(zj+1) is
only known in a discrete set of points zj+1 ∈S×I×S×A× H × P×E, this maximization
problem can not be solved analytically. Therefore we have to use the following numerical
maximization and interpolation algorithms to compute households optimal decision:
1. Compute (3) in age J for all possible zJ. Notice that V(zJ+1)=0 and households are
not allowed to work anymore and they die for sure in the next period. Hence, they
consume all their resources.
2. Find (3) for all possible zj by using Powell’s algorithm (Press et al., 1996, 406ff.). Since
this algorithm requires a continuous function, we have to interpolate V(zj+1). Having
computed the data V(zj+1) for all zj+1 ∈S×I×S×A × H × P ×Ein the last step,





for all k = 1,...,nA, l = 1,...,nP and m = 1,...,nH. In this paper we use multidi-
mensional spline interpolation, see Habermann and Kindermann (2007).
The macroeconomic computational algorithm
Our simulations start from initial steady states which reﬂectthe German macroeconomy and
schooling system. The computation method follows the Gauss-Seidel procedure of Auer-
bach and Kotlikoff (1987). We start with a guess for aggregate variables, bequest distribution
and policy parameters. Then we compute the factor prices and the individual decision rules
and value functions. This involves a discretization of the state space which is explained
in the section before. Next we obtain the distribution of households and aggregate assets,
labor supply and consumption as well as the social security tax rate and the consumption
tax rate that balances government’s budget. This information allows us to update the initial
guesses. The procedure is repeated until the initial guesses and the resulting values for cap-
ital, labor, bequests and endogenous taxes have sufﬁciently converged. Next we solve for
12a new long-run equilibrium resulting from a change in educational policy and compare the
results.
3 Calibration of the initial equilibrium
This section describes how we ﬁt our model to German data. Parameters of the produc-
tion function for human capital on-the-job and the autoregressive process for labor income
shocks are estimated from German Socio-Economic Panel data (SOEP), a description of
which can be found in Wagner et al. (2007). Finally, we calibrate the remaining parame-
ters in order to match main macroeconomic variables observed in Germany in 2007.
The timing of the model is as follows: as each model period covers 1 year, agents start life
at age 15 (j = 1), are forced to retire at age 61 (jr = 47) and face a maximum possible life
span of 100 years (J = 85). We assume three different educational classes: lower secondary,
higher secondary and tertiary education. Ages of entry into the labor market are 15 (j1 = 1),
20 (j2 = 6) and and 25 (j3 = 11) respectively, i.e. every additional educational degree needs
5 additional years of studying.
3.1 Parameter estimation for on-the-job training
In order to estimate the parameters for on-the-job human capital formation and the autore-
gressive income process, we use inﬂated income data yits of primary household earnersfrom
the GermanSOEP. Our unbalanced paneldata covers full-time workers betweenages 20 and
60 of the years 1984 to 2006 and was divided into different educational groups according to
the International Standard Classiﬁcation of Education (ISCED) of the UNESCO of 1997. In
order to receive three groups, we merge levels 0 to 2 (primary and lower secondary edu-
cation), levels 3 and 4 (higher secondary and post-secondary education) as well as levels
5 and 6 (tertiary education) to one group each. This approach leads us to a total of 81798
observations, where we have 11298, 54081 and 16419 observations in groups one to three,
respectively.
Having extracted this data from the SOEP, we use a variant of the estimation technique
proposed by Heckman et al. (1998). Speciﬁcally, we take the above household model and
assume that there are no shocks to labor income, agents are not liquidity constraint and there
is no leisure consumption. In order to make the model comparable to the above speciﬁcation
with leisure choice, we assume for the estimation process a maximum time endowment of
0.4, which amounts to a 40 hours workweek length, see Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987). Fol-
13lowing Taber (2002), we then approximate the German tax schedule of 2005 using a second
order polynomial Ta.
In this simpliﬁed model setup, we can separate consumption choice from human capital
investment decisions. Hence, an agent’s utility maximizing amount of on-the-job-training




(0.4 − ej)hj(1 − τ)+pj
− Ta
 




1 + r(1 − τr)
 
, (28)
where hj and epj evolve according to (10) and (9), respectively. As we use a partial equilib-
rium model for the estimation procedure, we normalize the interest rate r = 0.05 and set
the wages per efﬁciency unit of all three types of labor to 1. Next, we ﬁx the pension con-
tribution rate at τ = 0.195 and choose an actual pension amount which is close to the one
predicted from our general equilibrium model. Our model extends the estimation model
of Taber (2002) by explicitly accounting for a PAYG pension system. As a PAYG pension
system prolongates the period of yield of human capital investment, it is essential to our es-
timation model and has a major inﬂuence on the estimated parameters. Unfortunately, due
to the lack of data, we can’t estimate ability parameters that depend on agent’s educational
background.
With the above model, we now estimate the parameters As,νs and ωs in the following way
via non-linear least squares. We ﬁrst set depreciation rates δs exogenously, so that we obtain
a good ﬁt of the model to the data. Speciﬁcally, we assume no depreciation for the educa-
tional classes 1 and 2 in accordance with Heckman et al. (1998) and a slight depreciation
of δ3 = 0.005 for class 3 in order to account for the falling labor efﬁciency at the end of the
working life in this group, compare Figure 2. Next, we start with some initial guesses of
parameters As,νs,ωs and compute the age gross income proﬁles ˆ yts =( 0.4 − ej)hj for every







(log(yits) − log(ˆ yts))2. (29)
Our algorithm updates the parameter guesses in order to minimize RSS.
Theresultingparametersandthecorresponding Huber-White typestandard errors(inparen-
theses) are reported in Table 1. Estimated gross income proﬁles and the respective means
computed from the data are shown in Figure 2. Note that, due to the lack of data, we can
only estimate the initial level of human capital at age 20 for the lowest educational group.
Given the estimated parameters, this corresponds to a level of h1 = 7.5957 at age 15, the age
of labor market entry.
14Table 1: Parameter estimates for human capital production functions
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
ability As 0.2469 0.2874 0.2628
(0.1940) (0.1311) (0.4897)
elasticity educational time νs 0.9838 0.9448 0.8784
(0.0065) (0.0035) (0.0132)
elasticity human capital ωs 0.6723 0.6138 0.7294
(0.0052) (0.1874) (0.6340)
initial human capital hjs 9.8856 10.4692 16.7978
(0.0119) (0.0223) (0.1023)
Figure 2: Estimated and mean income proﬁles

























3.2 Estimating the autoregressive income process
Taking log residuals of our above parameter estimation, we can now estimate labor income
processes. Following Love (2007), we assume an autoregressive structure
πj =  πj−1 +  j ,  j ∼ N(0,σ2
 ) and π0 = 0. (30)
15Concerning our data, we therefore estimate the equation
log(yits) − log(ˆ yts)=υi + πit (31)
with an individual effect υi ∼ N(0,σ2
υ) separately for any of the three educational groups s
by meansofGLS, assuming π tofollow anAR(1)process asin(30). Thisapproach leadsusto
the parameterestimatesshown in Table2(standard errors are again reported in parenthesis).
Table 2: Parameter estimates for individual productivity
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
AR(1) correlation   0.6999 0.7807 0.7679
(0.0111) (0.0043) (0.0085)
persistent variance σ2
υ 0.0211 0.0340 0.0938
(0.0041) (0.0033) (0.0078)
transitory variance σ2
  0.0635 0.0728 0.0801
(0.0044) (0.0036) (0.0069)
There are two things to notice. First, we ﬁnd a strong AR(1) correlation of around 0.75 for
the error term, which lies in the range of typical values for these types of models, see e.g.
Love (2007). Second, except for group 3, we see a small persistent variance, which means
that our groups are strongly homogeneous. In the highest educational group, however,
there is a certain chance of climbing up into the area of extraordinary high salaries or failing
and just getting a job for higher secondary earners. This makes the group somewhat more
heterogeneous and explains a higher variance of the individual effect.
For computational reasons, we ﬁnally approximate the shock π by a ﬁrst order discrete
Markov process with two nodes using a discretization algorithm as described in Tauchen
(1986).
3.3 The schooling choice
In order to calibrate the schooling choice, we set the standard deviation of psychological
costs at σ = 0.001121, which is in line with the estimates reported in Heckman et al. (1998).4
Next we set the expected values μis like in Table 3.
Withthis speciﬁcation wecan replicate theobserved schooling transition matrix inGermany.
Table 4 reports on the left hand side the schooling choices of agents of different educational
4 We adjusted the standard deviation in order to account for the fact that we let agents make their schooling
choice via a comparison of utilities, not present values of income.
16Table 3: Expected values of psychological costs




backgrounds generated from our model. On the right hand side, we report estimates from
Heineck and Riphahn (2009), who estimated transitional probabilities from German SOEP
data.
Table 4: Decision matrix
Model Data
sp \ s 123 sp \ s 123
1 52.99 35.33 11.67 1 53.86 35.14 11.00
2 15.28 51.07 33.66 2 16.05 50.60 33.35
3 8.05 34.19 57.76 3 8.95 33.71 57.34
Finally, weﬁx the probability of failingat pf = 0.2which isin line with the fraction of college
dropouts reported in AB (2008). This leads to a college premium of 49.2 percent, which
corresponds to the tertiary education wage premium estimated for Germany in Strauss and
de La Maisonneuve (2007).
3.4 Parameterizing the model
Table 5 reports the central remaining parameters of the model. The population growth rate
is set at n = 0.0, since population growth is close to zero in Germany. The conditional
survival probabilities ψj are computed from the year 2000 Life Tables for Germany reported
in Bomsdorf (2003).
With respect to the preference parameters, we set the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
γ at 0.5 and the intratemporal elasticity of substitution ρ at 0.6. This is within the range of
commonly used values (see Auerbach and Kotlikoff, 1987, Fehr, 1999). Next, we calibrate
the leisure preference parameter α in order to obtain an average labor time of 0.4 which
corresponds to a 40 hours workweek length, see Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987). In order to
calibrate a realistic capital to output ratio, the discount factor is set at 0.981 which implies
17Table 5: Parameter selection
Demographic Individual Technology Government
parameters parameters parameters parameters
J = 85 γ = 0.5 θ = 1.79 τc = 0.17
jr = 47 ρ = 0.6 ε = 0.35 BG/ Y = 0.6
j1 = 1 α = 0.5 δk = 0.059 ds = 1800
j2 = 6 δ = 0.981 χ = 1.144 d(wj)=1200 + 0.04wj
j3 = 11   = 0.4 λ1 = 0.22 T(yw,yr) see text
jp = 28 ζ = 0.16 λ2 = 0.37 APA see text
n = 0.0 λ3 = 0.40
ψj :Bomsdorf (2003)
an annual discount rate of roughly 2 percent. Finally, we let the time students devote to
studying be 40 hours per week, i.e.   = 0.4 and the fraction of income transmitted from
parents to their studying children 16 percent, which corresponds to the ﬁgures reported in
AB (2008).
With respect to technology parameters we specify the general factor productivity θ = 1.79
in order to normalize labor income and set the capital share in production ε at 0.35. We set
the elasticity of substitution between different types of labor at 1.441 which is equal to the
estimate of Heckman et al. (1998) for US data and calibrate the input shares λs so that the
marginal product of labor equals 1 for every type of education. The annual depreciation rate
for capital is set at 5.9 percent, the annual APA value is chosen in order to derive a replace-
ment rate of net income of 60 percent, which yields a realistic contribution rate for Germany.
As already explained, the taxation of gross income (from labor, capital and pensions) is close
to the current German income tax code. We apply the marginal tax rate schedule T05 which
was introduced in 2005 to labor and pension income and a ﬂat tax of 25 percent to interest
payments. In addition, we consider a special allowance for labor income of d(wj) which
combines a ﬁxed amount of 1200 e and an additional deduction of 0.04 percent of labor in-
come and a ﬁxed allowance of 1800 e for capital income. Given taxable labor income yw
j ,t h e
marginal tax rate rises linearly after the basic allowance of 7800 e from 15 percent to maxi-
mum of 42 percent when yj passes 52.000 e. A solidarity surcharge of 5.5 percent is added
to the total amount of taxes. In the initial long-run equilibrium, we assume a debt-to-output
ratio of 60 percent, ﬁx the consumption tax rate at 17 percent and compute G endogenously
to balance the budget.
183.5 The initial equilibrium
Table 6 reports the calibrated benchmark equilibrium and the respective ﬁgures for Ger-
many in 2007. As one can see, the initial equilibrium reﬂects quite realistically the current




Capital-output ratio 3.0 2.9a
Educational government spending (in % of GDP) 5.0 5.0b
- secondary education 3.9 3.9b
- tertiary education 1.1 1.1b
Pension beneﬁts (% of GDP) 12.1 11.5a
Pension contribution rate (in %) 19.5 19.9a
Tax revenues (in % of GDP) 22.4 23.8a
Other benchmark coefﬁcients
Interest rate p.a. (in %) 5.0 –
Bequest (in % of GDP) 4.2 4.7-7.1c
Human capital formed on-the-job (in %)
- lower secondary education 22.8 –
- higher secondary education 12.7 –
- tertiary education 16.4 –
Educational participation (in %)
- lower secondary education 60.3 65.7b
- higher secondary education 26.8 20.3b
- tertiary education 12.9 13.6b
Wage premium on tertiary education (in %) 49.2 48.4d
Source: aIdW (2009), bAB (2008), cBraun (2002),
dStrauss and de La Maisonneuve (2007).
macroeconomic situation in Germany. The interest rate of 5.0 percent per year is the same
as the one we used in our estimation procedure. The amount of human capital produced
via on-the-job training in the different educational classes is depicted as a fraction of initial
human capital hjs.5 The educational participation rates are the number of people in different
educational programs (according to the ISCED standard) as a fraction of the overall popu-
lation that currently is in educational programs. The share of lower secondary education
5 A value of 1% consequently means that the agent increases his labor efﬁciency throughout the life-cycle by
1% of the initial human capital he has when entering the labor market.
19participants is relatively low, compared to the German data, as we assume a dropout age of
15, whereas in reality there are also people dropping out at 16.
4 Simulation results
This section presents simulation results from our model. We thereby proceed in the follow-
ing way. Starting from the long-run equilibrium described in Table 6, we implement some
educational ﬁnancing reform and compute the resulting new long-run equilibrium. In order
to obtain comparability, we ﬁx general government expenditure and government debt per
capita and let the consumption tax rate balance the government’s period-by-period budget.
4.1 Privatizing tertiary education
InGermany, atthemoment, tertiary educationis (nearly)completelypubliclysubsidised, i.e.
government paysforallthedirectcosts of tertiary education.6 Comingfrom such asituation,
we will ﬁrst study the effects of a pure privatization of the tertiary education system. We
therefore calculate the per student cost of education in our initial steady state and collect this
amount as tuition fees from every student in every year of tertiary education. This seems
to be an extremely radical reform of the education system, however, it allows us to quantify
all the different effects that are at work in our model. In order to strengthen the necessity
of endogenous schooling, general equilibrium price determination and endogenous initial
distribution of agents across socio-economic background, in the left column of Table 7, we
will start from a partial equilibrium model, where all these features are absent. With every
new simulation, we then gradually move into the direction of the general equilibrium model
described in Section 2.
Starting from a model with exogenous schooling, ﬁxed prices and exogenous group densi-
ties,7 privatization of tertiary education has very little effects. Capital and therefore output
rise slightly, as especially agents in the ﬁrst periods of life, before going into tertiary edu-
cation, save more in order to distribute the burdens from tuition over a broader period of
their life. As prices are ﬁxed, the interest rate stays at it’s initial value. With the expendi-
ture on tertiary education now being ﬁnanced directly by students, the consumption tax rate
decreases by 1.8 percentage points, as the expenditure was 1.1 percent as a fraction of GDP
6 Obviously, government does not pay for students’ overall cost of living







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































21in the initial equilibrium and consumption is about 60 percent of GDP. The wage premium
on tertiary education as well as the human capital index, which denotes per capita human
capital of the working population, stay constant, as prices and schooling choice are ﬁxed.
Labor supply especially increases for agents with lower education level. This is due to the
fact that now students in the upper secondary education sector that might become college
students afterwards and college students themselves, who provide labor of types s = 1
and s = 2, respectively, now work longer in order to compensate for the strongly binding
liquidity constraints during their college years. This ﬁnding is in line with Garriga and
Keightley (2007). For fully educated agents, we ﬁnd a decrease in labor supply, as the price
of consumption drops with the consumption tax rate and therefore leisure consumption
increases. Wages and the fraction of people having completed different educational systems
obviously can’t change, because prices and schooling choice are ﬁxed.
Finally, we report welfare changes for different groups. In the ﬁrst line, we compute the
average consumption equivalent variation of agents in different educational levels at the
moment they can be distinguished, i.e. j = 1f o rs = 1a n dj = 6f o rs = 2a n d3 . 8 People
enrolling in college obviously experience strong welfare losses, as they have to carry the di-
rect costs from education themselves and their liquidity constraints now bite much stronger
than in the initial equilibrium. With the consumption tax rate decreasing, lower educated
households, on the other hand, gain from this reform. In the next line we decompose welfare
change in the initial year j = 1 with respect to different socio-economic backgrounds. Now,
we ﬁnd welfare lossesfor alldifferent typesofag e n t sd u et ot h et r e m e n d o u sl o s si ns t u d e n t ’ s
welfare which can’t be offset by welfare gains of other types. Welfare losses obviously have
to increase with socio-economic background, as the ex-ante probability of becoming a stu-
dent rises with parental education level sp. Finally, aggregating over sp, ex-ante welfare also
has to decrease.
In the second column of Table 7, we relax the assumption of ﬁxed schooling choice and
let households decide endogenously about their schooling level. Capital and output now
decrease tremendously due to the huge decline in the number of high skilled agents and
therefore high income earners. In contrast to the previous simulation, the consumption tax
rate has to increase in order to compensate for the shortfall in tax revenues caused by a
decreasing income tax base. With the fraction of lower skilled agents in the population in-
creasing, the human capital index decreases by 11.3 percent. Labor supply in the lower two
educational classes has to rise, since the number of people choosing these education levels
increases. The opposite obviously is the case for the third class. We ﬁnd that the number of
8 Starting with j = 6 instead of j = 11 for the highest educational class, we cover the whole period of study
with all the related burdens for those agents.
22students decreases tremendously by about 28 percent, because the costs of tertiary eduction
now have to be completely carried by students and liquidity constraints bite much stronger
than before.
Thematrix intherows called”Schooling choice”showsthe behaviorofpeoplewithdifferent
socio-economic backgrounds, i.e. parents’ educational levels sp. We can read the columns as
follows: due to the reform, the ex-ante probability of going to college for a child whose par-
ents have low education decreases by 11.1 percentage points. Households enroll into college
less often after the privatization of tertiary education, as they now have to carry the costs
of education themselves and their liquidity constraints bite much stronger. In addition, we
ﬁnd that the probability of attending college is reduced much more for students with higher
socio-economic backgrounds. However, we have to keep in mind, that those households
already tended to go to college more often in the initial equilibrium. If one recalls that only
11.7 percent of agents with low skilled parents, i.e. sp = 1, went to college before the reform,
a reduction of 11.1 percentage points means a nearly 100 percent decline in the number of
students for this class. For households with sp = 2, the reduction consequently is around 90
percent, whereas for sp = 3 agents, it only amounts to 61 percent.
As for the welfare of agents, we see that the welfare difference between agents of lower
education and highest education level stays rather constant at about 6 percent of initial re-
sources. However, aggregate welfare declines with the decrease in capital and the accompa-
nying decrease in bequests.
In the next simulation, we assume prices to be determined endogenously. Complete pri-
vatization of tertiary education now comes with a long-run decline in assets of 2.4 percent,
since the number of students and therefore the number of high earners still is reduced. This
leads to a reduction in output of 2.9 percent. With overall labor supply being affected in
the same direction, the interest rate stays constant. The consumption tax rate declines by
about 0.8 percentage points due to the fallen need for educational spending. However, this
move is rather modest, compared to simulation (1), as both the income and the consump-
tion tax base are narrowed by the reform. The expected wage premium of tertiary education
increases by 46.6 percentage points, which means it nearly doubles. This is due to the fact
that wages of secondary and tertiary educated earners are spread. Finally, the human capital
index decreases with the fallen number of students in the population.
As labor supply again is shifted towards lower schooling levels, wages react in the opposite
way. Note that the spread in wages makes human capital a more risky investment, which in
turn enforces the reduction incollege graduates. The overall numberofuniversity graduates
thereby declines by 8.2 percentage points, which means a reduction of over 20 percent of
students.
23We ﬁnd that especially schooling choice of agents with poorer backgrounds is inﬂuenced by
the reform, as they can’t easily afford the tuition fees. The reduction in college participation
rates is lower for class 1 than for class 2, because children from the lowest socio-economic
background alreadydidn’tchoose to goto college very often in the initial equilibrium. Inad-
dition, we see that the vast increase in returns for tertiary education due to the wage spread
even for children with better educated parents does not provide enough incentive to go to
college more often. This is due to the accompanying rise in tertiary education investment
risk and the fact that students now have to pay for their costs of education themselves.
Interestingly, now the welfare of college students is higher than that of agents from lower
educational classes, because of the decrease in wages for lower income earners and the
tremendous rise in the college wage premium. In terms of welfare of agents with differ-
ent socio-economic backgrounds, i.e. before the ﬁrst schooling choice is made, we ﬁnd a
strong loss of 4.38 to 4.54 percent of initial resources. This is due to several reasons: the
decline in tertiary education rates, harder binding liquidity constraints during the phase of
tertiary education and the decline in assets which comes with decreasing bequests. With the
huge drop in wages for lower educated households and the resulting rise in inequality, the
overall welfare loss is higher than in Simulation (2), although bequests decline much less.
In the last simulation, in the righter column of Table 7, we now let the initial distribution of
agents across different parental backgrounds be endogenous.9 As one can see, the macroe-
conomic effects are pretty much the same as in the exogenous group density case. However,
the schooling choice matrix is heavily affected. This is due to the fact that the initial distri-
bution of agents now changes in the long-run exactly in the way as the fraction of people
in different educational classes (see line ”Fraction of”). The dynamics of schooling choice is
therefore as follows: resulting from the privatization reform, people of all classes choose to
go to college less often. In the long-run, this leads to a reduction in college graduates and
therefore a reduction in the number of people whose parents are rich. As the number of peo-
ple with poorer socio-economic backgrounds, who do not go to college so often, increases,
the number of college graduates decreases further. With the reaction in factor prices, the
incentive for a single individual to go to college now again rises and, hence, the number
of households joining the tertiary education sector tends to increase for each educational
background. Neglecting the dampening effect via a change in initial distributions, a model
of exogenous distribution consequently leads to an overestimation in schooling choice re-
sponses. It might even be that reactions change signs, as in the case of people with rich
socio-economic background.
9 I.e. schooling choice affects the amount of people in different educational classes, which in turn determines
the initial distribution of people across different parental backgrounds.
24As the spread between college workers and those of other educational classes even increases
and the expected tertiary education premium rises, high skilled agents are better off com-
pared to the previous simulation. In addition, in terms of socio-economic backgrounds,
those who tend to be lower educated (sp = 1,2) lose and people from richer socio-economic
background gain. This leads to a reduction in ex-ante welfare, compared to the previous
case, of 0.6 percent.
Summing up, we ﬁnd that endogenous determination of prices and initial distribution of
agents across socio-economic backgrounds has a major impact on the model results com-
ing from privatization of tertiary education. Changes in wages for different types of labor
widen the gap between lower and high skilled agents. As a consequence, students are better
off compared to workers from other educational classes, since the falling consumption tax
rate can’t offset the decrease in income. In addition, endogenous determination of initial
distribution across parental education levels sp alters the schooling choice reaction of agents
and widens the gap between higher and lower skilled agents. As a consequence, aggregate
welfare decreases.
4.2 The design of governmental student loans
A larger part of the welfare losses and the declining number of students, resulting from pri-
vatization of tertiary education, are due to stronger binding liquidity constraints. In order to
relax this effect, we now simulate a reform proposed by Garc´ ıa-Pe˜ nalosa and W¨ alde (2000).
Together with the privatization of tertiary education, we introduce an income contingent
student loan system. In this system, students receive exactly the amount of tuition fees dur-
ing their period of study from the government. Having graduated, there are 5 repayment-
free years after which the loan has to be payed back over a time-span of 10 years. However,
the loan is income contingent, i.e. only students who pass the ﬁnal exam and do not drop
back to the higher-secondary educational class have to pay it back. The remaining bur-
den coming from high-school drop-outs will be ﬁnanced by consumption taxes. Hence, in
addition to loosening liquidity constraints early in life, this type of loan provides partial
insurance against the risk of college failure.
The results from such a reform can be seen from the left part of Table 8. Capital decreases
even further, compared to Simulation (4) in Table 7, although the number of students is not
reduced that much. This is a natural reaction from people being allowed to run into debt
in the ﬁrst periods of life. Aggregate labor supply is hardly affected. Therefore, output
decreases only by 1.3 percent and the interest rate rises slightly. As the income tax base is
not narrowed, the consumption tax rate can decrease much more compared to the previous
25Table 8: Student loans
Simulation number (5) (6) (7)
Privatization yes no no
Interest with with without
Capitala -3.1 -0.8 0.0
Outputa -1.3 0.2 0.5
Interest rateb 0.2 0.1 0.1
Cons. taxb -2.3 -0.7 0.1
Wage premiumb 9.9 -7.9 -10.5
Human capital indexa -1.7 0.6 1.2
s = 1 2 3 123 1 23
Labora 4.5 4.4 -6.2 -3.0 -3.2 6.1 -4.4 -4.5 7.8
Wagesa -4.2 -4.1 3.3 2.1 2.2 -4.1 3.4 3.5 -4.9
Fraction ofb 1.2 2.2 -3.5 -0.4 -0.3 0.7 -0.8 -1.0 1.8
Schooling choiceb
- sp = 1 0.5 0.9 -1.4 -0.9 -0.3 1.2 -1.1 -0.6 1.7
- sp = 2 0.5 2.3 -2.8 -0.3 -0.8 1.1 -0.5 -1.5 1.9
- sp = 3 0.5 1.9 -2.4 0.2 0.3 -0.5 0.1 -0.2 0.2
s = 1 2 3 123 1 23
Welfare changec -0.51 -0.44 -0.96 1.21 1.19 0.91 1.33 1.28 1.16
sp = 1 2 3 123 1 23
Welfare changec -0.51 -0.59 -0.79 1.32 1.31 0.73 1.44 1.46 0.94
Total welfare changec -0.80 1.13 1.34
Change in apercent over initial equilibrium, bpercentage points, cpercent of initial resources.
cases. The wage premium increases by 9.9 percentage points and the human capital index
decreases by 1.7 percent, since the fraction of students is reduced less than before.
The reactions of labor supply, wages and fraction of students are much less intense, as stu-
dents now can easily afford tuition fees during their time of study. Due to the differences
between people with different educational backgrounds being much smaller after gradua-
tion than before (all of them are high-wage earners then), the reform affects households with
different educational backgrounds nearly in the same way, i.e. it seems to be socially more
acceptable. The effect is slightly higher for people with richer socio-economic backgrounds
as they tended to go to university in the initial equilibrium more often. A remarkable point
is that, even though income contingent loans do provide insurance against tertiary educa-
tion risk, people enroll in college less often than under the public education scheme. This is
26due to the fact that people still have to pay for their tertiary education on their own, which
derogates the rental rate on tertiary education.
In opposite to the previous simulation, in terms of welfare we now ﬁnd that college stu-
dents are worse off than households in other educational classes, as the reaction of marginal
products of labor is much smaller than before and the consumption tax rate decreases fur-
ther. In addition, agents with richer parents are hurt more by the reform. This is because
those households study with the highest probability and, therefore, publicly ﬁnanced higher
education distributed towards those agents in the initial equilibrium. As this redistribu-
tion mechanism is absent after the reform, they lose most. Note, ﬁrst, that it is not clear to
which extend welfare losses in the long-run are due to intertemporal redistribution. With
the decline in assets, bequests decrease nearly in the same manner and therefore long-run
welfare decreases. Second, ex-ante aggregate welfare loss is higher than any educational
class speciﬁc welfare loss. This comes from the initial distribution of agents with different
socio-economic backgrounds changing. With the declining number of students, the ex-ante
probability of having rich parents decreases. As people with lower socio-economic back-
ground do enroll into college less often, people tend to be lower educated and therefore earn
less income. This second effect is only incorporated in the ex-ante aggregate welfare, not in
the welfare of people with different educational background, i.e. after their socio-economic
status is revealed.
In the previous section we found that privatization of tertiary education comes with a vast
reduction in the number of students. However, income contingent loans work against this
problem. Hence, we now want to quantify the effects of a governmental loan system that
is introduced on top of the German publicly ﬁnanced tertiary education system in order to
ﬁnance student’s cost of living and further relax borrowing constraints. We hereby want to
focus on the schooling choice of households with different parental backgrounds and the
inﬂuence on the number of students in the economy. Therefore, we introduce in Simulation
(6) an income contingent loan of 6000e, which amounts to the standard rate of the German
BAf¨ oG, a student assistance system, see Statistisches Bundesamt (2005). The results from
such a reform can be seen from the middle column of Table 8.
Capital decreases with liquidity constraints being loosened. With a slight increase in labor
supply dueto a higherfraction ofstudents, output aswell asthe interest rate decline slightly.
A student loan system in which students have to paybackloans plusinterest runs some gov-
ernmental surplus, as the natural interest rate in our model equals the population growth
rate n = 0. Together with the increase in income tax revenues, this over-compensates the
burden from income contingency and, consequently, consumption taxes fall. Finally, as the
number of students as well as labor supply in the highest educational class increase, wages
react in the opposite way and the wage premium decreases. The human capital index obvi-
27ously has to rise.
We can see that the number of students increases by 0.7 percentage points. In addition,
the schooling choice of people with different educational backgrounds is affected. Whereas
the number of students increases by around 1 percentage points in the two lower socio-
economic classes, agents with rich parents reduce their college enrolment by 0.5 percentage
points. The decrease in college enrolment for the latter is a consequence of the decline in
college graduate wages of around 4 percent.
Welfare effects are now positive for all three types of agents. This is mainly due to inter-
generational redistribution. As the consumption tax decreases, long-run generations gain
from the reform. Surprisingly, college students, who should be the main beneﬁciaries from
additional student loans, gain less than households from lower schooling levels. This is
mainly due to the reduction in wages. As a consequence, agents with richer socio-economic
backgrounds gain less than the poorer, because they go to university more often.
In the last column of Table 8, we implementan income contingent loans system, where loans
have to be payed back without interest. This isclose to the practice of the BAf¨ oG in Germany
and acts like an additional subsidy to higher education. Here, obviously, the system does
not run a surplus anymore and the consumption tax has to rise slightly. Due to a larger
fraction of the population now being highly educated and the progressive tax schedule,
labor income tax revenues rise signiﬁcantly. Hence, most of the burden arising from income
contingency is carried by college graduates, which is why the rise in consumption tax rates
is pretty small. The common argument that mainly people with lower education carry the
burden of subsidies to higher education therefore does not hold in our model.
With the number of students increasing signiﬁcantly by 1.8 percentage points, the wage and
therefore the wage premium for tertiary education decrease further compared to the previ-
ous simulations. Note that in this simulation college enrolment rates increase for all three
different types of socio-economic backgrounds. However, due to stronger binding liquidity
constraints, the effect is larger for agents with poorer parents. Finally, with tertiary educa-
tion being subsidised, welfare for all three types of households as well as aggregate welfare
slightly increase. However, we still ﬁnd that college students gain less than households from
lower educations classes, as the college wage premium is reduced signiﬁcantly.
4.3 Sensitivity analysis
In order to check for the robustness of our results, we perform a sensitivity analysis. The
ﬁrst row in Table 9 repeats the results from the last reform in Table 8. We ﬁrst study the
same reform under the assumption of a small open economy with an interest rate equal
28to the one in our initial equilibrium. As we see nearly no change in capital and interest
rate in the previous simulations, the results obviously do not change very much. Next,
we keep the assumption of a small open economy in order to hold the capital output ratio
constant and obtain comparability. We then change some of the central parameters of the
model. Note that, in the column ”Incr. in students” we show the percentage change in the
number of students, as, due to parameter changes, the amount of college students in the
initial equilibrium might change.
Table 9: Sensitivity analysis
Open Cons. Wage Incr. in
economy φγρχpf ξ Assets tax rate premium studentsa Welfare
no 2.00 0.50 0.60 1.41 0.20 0.16 -0.1 0.1 -10.5 4.6 1.34
yes -1.0 0.1 -10.5 4.6 1.35
yes 0.00 -1.2 0.1 -10.0 4.1 1.32
yes 0.70 -0.2 0.0 -2.7 0.0 0.20
yes 0.30 0.1 0.0 -12.6 7.4 -0.01
yes 0.50 -1.9 0.3 -11.4 0.0 1.18
yes 0.00 -2.6 -0.2 -10.9 0.7 1.69
yes 0.00 0.4 -0.1 -15.2 12.6 0.49
ain percent of number in initial equilibrium.
In order to isolate risk aversion from intertemporal substitution, we follow Epstein and Zin



















The parameter φ deﬁnes the degree of (relative) risk aversion. For the special case φ = 1
γ
we are back at the traditional expected utility speciﬁcation discussed above, see Epstein and
Zin (1991, 266). Consequently, setting relative risk aversion at φ = 2.0 yields the benchmark
equilibrium reported in Table 6.
If we now set the relative risk aversion at φ = 0, we only ﬁnd slight changes of the results.
This suggests that the insurance provision against tertiary education risk only plays a mi-
nor role in our simulations. The increased number of students is therefore mostly due to
subsidies and loosened liquidity constraints. We now set back relative risk aversion at a
value of 2.0 and change the intertemporal rate of substitution to 0.7. The consumption pro-
ﬁle therefore becomes steeper over the life-cycle and liquidity constraints tend to bind much
less. Hence, a policy that tries to loosen liquidity effects has nearly no inﬂuence on college
29enrollment and the macroeconomy. The remaining welfare gains are due to the insurance
provision arising from income contingency. Changing the intratemporal rate of substitu-
tion to 0.3 decreases the elasticity of labor supply. This makes households less sensitive to
the development of marginal products. Hence, the decline in wages for college workers
has a minor effect and the fraction of college students increases compared to the previous
simulations. However, we ﬁnd no welfare gain anymore, since wages for college workers
now decrease more than 9 percent and those of lower educated do not rise. Next we set
the elasticity of substitution between different types of labor from 1.41 to 0.5. Consequently,
marginal products will react much stronger in order to insure that the composition of labor
does not change so much. As a result the number of students does not increase and wel-
fare gains are lower compared to the benchmark. However, the macroeconomic and welfare
effects are pretty much the same. Setting the college failure rate at 0, in the initial equilib-
rium there is already a huge number of students. Consequently, a reform to improve the
number of students has smaller effects on the college participation rates than in the previ-
ous reforms. Finally, eliminating intergenerational transfers, i.e. ξ = 0, liquidity constraints
obviously bind much stronger and the number of students increases signiﬁcantly with the
reform. However, aggregate welfare declines with a stronger decrease in the college wage
premium.
5 Discussion
In this paper, we study the long-run effects of educational ﬁnance policies and student loan
systems. We therefore construct a model in the tradition of Heckman et al. (1998) and Gal-
lipoli et al. (2008). Our model features two schooling choices and therefore three schooling
classes, lower secondary, higher secondary and tertiary education. As students might fail in
college, tertiary education is a risky investment. In addition to choosing their optimal level
of education, workers can build human capital on the job, where labor income underlies a
stochastic process. A detailed modeling of the German government sector complements our
analysis.
We ﬁnd in this model, which is carefully calibrated to the German economy in 2007, that
privatization of tertiary education comes with a vast reduction in the number of students,
an increase in the college wage premium and long-run welfare losses of around 5 percent of
initial resources. Our model accounts for the fact that schooling choice of agents affects the
initial distribution of households over different socio-economic backgrounds in the long-
run. Put simply, if less people decide to enroll at college, there will be less children whose
parents are college graduates. A major point of the paper is that, if one takes this effect
30into account, the schooling choice behavior of agents with different backgrounds is signiﬁ-
cantly affected. Surprisingly, we ﬁnd that from privatization of tertiary education, students
are better off compared to workers from other educational classes, since the college wage
premium nearly doubles. The decline in consumption tax rates can’t offset the decrease in
labor income for lower educated households. This result is in contrast to common theoreti-
cal models of schooling, where wages usually are ﬁxed, see e.g. Garc´ ıa-Pe˜ nalosa and W¨ alde
(2000).
In addition, our model predicts that the declining college enrolment rates and welfare losses
for tertiary education privatization can’t be offset by an income contingent student loan
system, which shifts the burden of tuition to later periods in life, hence, relaxes borrowing
constraints, and provides insurance against college failure. However, due to the dampened
reactions in the number of students causing only a slight increase in the college wage pre-
mium as well as a stronger decline in consumption tax rates, college workers are now worse
off compared to lower skilled workers.
We also quantify the effects of student loan schemes that are implemented on top of the
current publicly ﬁnanced tertiary education system in Germany. Two major points arise
from our analysis. First, income contingent loans might reduce enrolment rates for people
with richer socio-economic backgrounds due to the reduction in the college wage premium.
Second, loans on which students don’t have to pay interest, i.e. loans that act like a ter-
tiary education subsidy, improve the college enrolment situation for agents from all kinds
of socio-economic backgrounds. With income revenues increasing with this reforms, the
burdens arising from income contingency are carried to a large part by successful college
graduates and, hence, the consumption tax rate increases only slightly. Consequently, the
common argument that mainly people with lower education carry the burden of subsidies
to higher education does not hold in our model.
In the future, we plan to extend the model by a transition path and a Lump-sum Redistri-
bution Authority (LSRA) in the spirit of Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987). It is not clear to
which extend our welfare results depend on intergenerational redistribution. Consequently,
a LSRA compensation could quantify the pure efﬁciency effects of educational ﬁnance re-
forms. In addition, whith such a rich model of schooling choice and human capital forma-
tion, one could study the design of a optimal tax system. Optimal taxation has been studied
in theoretical models, like e.g. in Jacobs and Bovenberg (2009) or Anderberg and Andersson
(2003). Heckman et al. (1999) or Erosa and Koreshkova (2007), on the other hand, examine
the effect of replacing a progessive tax system by a linear one in a numerical model of hu-
man capital formation. Most of these studies, however, either neglect the effects of riskiness
in human capital or ignore the transition to a new long-run equilibrium resulting from a
change in the tax structure. Another application of our model would be to study the opti-
31mal design and progressivity of a pension system. As a pay-as-you-go pension prolongs the
time of yield of human capital investment, it is not clear to which extend the often postu-
lated privatization of social security deliversefﬁciency gains. On the other hand, the optimal
progressivity of a pension system is to be studied between the conﬂicting priorities of risk
insurance and encouraging people to build human capital.
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